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ABSTRACT
Friedrich Nietzsche thought that philosophers were deeply mistaken about the nature and sources of
philosophical activity. Where others took themselves to be motivated by a desire to know the truth,
Nietzsche charged that his fellow philosophers, motivated by a pathological set of psychological and
physiological characteristics, did little more than sublimate and rationalize their own prejudices. In
this thesis, I sketch out in further detail and defend the plausibility and significance of this
Nietzschean diagnosis of philosophers. I argue that since Nietzsche’s view of philosophers both
offers a compelling explanation of some phenomena in contemporary philosophical practice and,
were it true, would have significant upshot for how and even whether philosophy should be
practiced, we philosophers ought to begin taking it seriously.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Nietzsche has a lot to say about philosophers. He often insults and mocks us: he charges
that most philosophers “have no conception of the basic demands of intellectual integrity” (A 12),
that Socratic thinking “stinks of the rabble” (BGE 190), and that philosophers lack “genuine
honesty” (BGE 5).1 At other times, he psychoanalyses us: he claims that Spinoza’s “hocus pocus of a
mathematical form” reveals “personality timidity and vulnerability” (BGE 5), that philosophers
characteristically display “irritability and rancor against sensuality” (GM III: 7), and that a
philosophers’ moral beliefs “bear decided and decisive witness to who he is” (BGE 6). At still other
times, he enumerates the conditions conducive to philosophical activity: he tells us that philosophers
abhor marriage “as obstacle and doom along [their] path to the optimum” (GM III: 7), that “a
certain asceticism…a hard and lighthearted renunciation with the best of intentions belongs to the
most favorable conditions of highest spirituality [Geistigkeit]” (GM III: 9), and that “we philosophers
need rest from one thing before all else: from all ‘today’” (GM III: 8).
Despite the number and provocativeness of these remarks, commentators in the secondary
literature on Nietzsche have discussed his thoughts on philosophers only rarely and almost always
unsystematically. Although it is hardly a failing of any particular work that it does not engage
thoroughly with what Nietzsche says about philosophers, his comments do warrant systematic
treatment. For I think Nietzsche’s remarks about us philosophers constitute an account of
philosophy worth taking seriously. His frequent jabs are not, say, a mere series of unconnected ad
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Parenthentical citations of works by Nietzsche refer to the following: BGE-Beyond Good and Evil, ed. Rolf-Peter
Horstmann, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); D-Daybreak, eds. Maudemarie Clark
and Brian Leiter, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); HH-Human, All Too Human,
trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986); GM-On the Genealogy of Morality, trans.
Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998); TL-On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral
Sense, trans. Daniel Breazeale in ed. Daniel Breazeale Philosophy and Truth (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press,
1979); A, EH, and TI-The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings, eds. Aaron Ridley and Judith
Norman, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); BT-The Birth of Tragedy and Other
Writings, eds. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, trans. Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999);
GS-The Gay Science, ed. Bernard Williams, trans. Josephine Nauckhoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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hominem attacks. Rather, these jabs are pieces of a psychological account of philosophers that
purports to make sense of the behavior Nietzsche so often ridicules. On my view, Nietzsche thinks
that some people, drawn to quietude and contemplation, exhibit a set of psychological maladies that
lead them to reason poorly, overestimate their own significance, and attempt tasks that lie far
beyond their capabilities; these people become philosophers.2
A thorough engagement with Nietzsche’s remarks on philosophers is desirable for at least
two reasons. First, understanding what Nietzsche thought of his fellow philosophers promises to
inform our understanding of other parts of his work. For instance, if Nietzsche sees a philosopher’s
metaphysical and moral views as mere manifestations of his or her psychological needs, we may
suspect that Nietzsche would not seriously offer similar views of his own. Here, however, I will not
explore the implications of Nietzsche’s view of philosophers for exegetical issues, but will focus
instead on a second point: namely, on the philosophical upshot Nietzsche’s view would have, were it
correct.
A few philosophers and psychologists have recently turned their attention to the
psychological and sociological facts about philosophers and their discipline. For instance,
Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012, 2015) and Tobia et al. (2013) have studied philosophers’
sensitivity to order and framing effects, finding that philosophers’ judgments about the moral status
of hypothetical cases can be manipulated by framing or ordering those cases differently. Others such
as De Cruz (2015), Holtzman (2013), and Byrd (2015) have investigated the relationship between
philosophical views and irrelevant factors such as upbringing, personality, and cognitive style. Yet
other philosophers like Thomasson (2015) and Schroeder (2009) speculate that certain philosophical
views owe their popularity to how pleasing they are to hold or how well they stimulate philosophical
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activity. And much empirical work has been conducted that investigates the causes of the
underrepresentation of men of color and women in academic philosophy.
I think Nietzsche’s view of philosophers offers two things lacking in this contemporary
work. First, his view offers a psychological diagnosis of philosophers that promises to explain the
phenomena examined in these studies. For example, although Schwitzgebel and Cushman show that
philosophers’ moral judgments can be manipulated by irrelevant features of order and framing, they
do not explain why philosophers’ judgments are so vulnerable.3 Similarly, when Thomasson and
Schroeder speculate that some positions are popular for reasons having nothing to do with the
evidence in their favor, they do not explain why philosophers would form their views in this way.
Nietzsche, on the other hand, does provide a deeper account of philosophers’ psychology which
would explain, among other things, why philosophers form their views in the way they do.
Second, Nietzsche’s view, precisely because it offers a diagnosis of the phenomena
contemporary philosophers have identified, provides us with a helpful framework for thinking about
how we ought to respond to those phenomena. Although many of the recent studies of
philosophers’ cognition have suggested that that cognition is often flawed, there has been relatively
little discussion of how we ought to respond to the knowledge of those flaws. Nietzsche’s more
comprehensive account of philosophers’ psychology gives us a clearer picture of how much we
ought to worry about these flaws and how we ought to respond to them.
Of course, Nietzsche’s view is helpful for these ends only if it is at least roughly accurate.
For that reason, I’ll offer an argument that his account of philosophers is likely correct. While the
ideal way to evaluate his account would be to tally up detailed psychological profiles of individual

Perhaps the only explanation required here is that philosophers are humans, too. However, Schwitzgebel and Cushman
(2015) found that even those philosophers who claimed to have both familiarity with and stable opinions on the cases
presented to them were vulnerable to order and framing effects. Insofar as we would not expect these people to be
vulnerable to those effects, there remains some explanatory work to be done showing how these general cognitive flaws
influence even philosophers’ considered judgments.
3
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philosophers, this course of action is wildly unfeasible. Instead, I’ll make an argument to the best
explanation. Nietzsche’s psychological profile of philosophers provides the best explanation for a
widespread pattern of poor philosophical reasoning, and so it is likely to be true.
The structure of the remainder of this thesis is as follows. I begin by explaining Nietzsche’s
diagnosis of philosophers in more detail. Next, I argue that that diagnosis gives the best explanation
for certain facts about philosophical reasoning, and so it is likely to be true. I conclude by discussing
the bearing of Nietzsche’s account on explanations of other sociological phenomena in philosophy
and on philosophical practice itself.
2

NIETZSCHE’S ACCOUNT OF PHILOSOPHERS

I think we should view most of Nietzsche’s remarks on philosophers as explaining the
existence and nature of philosophical activity. That is, most of what Nietzsche says about us
philosophers aims to explain why we philosophize and why we philosophize as we do. Accordingly,
Nietzsche’s account can be divided into two parts. First, Nietzsche has a view of what it is about
philosophers that calls for explanation; call these their symptoms. Second, Nietzsche explains these
symptoms; call this his diagnosis. I’ll treat each of these pieces of the account in turn.
Before discussing the symptoms Nietzsche attributes to philosophers, it’s worth saying
something about how Nietzsche and I will use the term “philosopher.” Although Nietzsche
frequently makes broad claims about philosophers in general, he often has particular philosophers in
mind when making such claims, especially Socrates, Plato, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Hegel.4 For this
reason, we may doubt both that Nietzsche meant to claim that all philosophers show all the
symptoms he outlines and that contemporary philosophers will also show those symptoms. For
surely Kant and the like were rare breeds whose psychological characteristics were quite distinct

For a small sample of these remarks, see, e.g., TI “The Problem of Socrates” for some of Nietzsche’s remarks on
Socrates, BGE P and BGE 14 on Plato, BGE 5 and BGE 11 on Kant, GM III: 5-7 on Schopenhauer, and D P: 3, D 90,
and D 193 on Hegel.
4
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from those of both their contemporaries and present-day philosophers. I think the best way to read
Nietzsche’s claims about philosophers, then, is as detailing a sort of ideal philosopher who displays a
complete set of symptoms that any actual philosopher will fall more or less short of in various ways.
So although I’ll use the term “philosopher” broadly throughout this chapter, I don’t endorse the
claim that every philosopher, contemporaries included, fits Nietzsche’s description perfectly.5
2.1

Philosophers’ Symptoms

So what symptoms does Nietzsche think philosophers exhibit? One significant symptom is
the mismatch Nietzsche sees between philosophers’ view of themselves and their actual activity. As
he puts it in BGE 5, philosophers “all act as if they had discovered and arrived at their genuine
convictions through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely insouciant dialectic,” while “what
essentially happens is that…they take some fervent wish that they have sifted through and made
properly abstract – and they defend it with rationalizations after the fact.” Viewing philosophers in
this way allows us to name three questions Nietzsche’s explanation of philosophers ought to answer.
First, why do philosophers view themselves in the way they do? Second, why do philosophers act
the way that they do? Third, why do philosophers’ view of themselves and their actual activity lie so
far apart? Before showing how Nietzsche answers these questions, I’ll discuss in more detail the
explanatory task Nietzsche sets for himself with each one.
Nietzsche thinks that philosophers view themselves as careful, disinterested seekers of deep
and significant truths. As he sees it, philosophers think that they engage in philosophical activity
because of a will to truth; they want to know how the world is, and so they attempt to silence any
desires that the world be a certain way and use the most effective methods possible to learn the
metaphysical and moral truth.6 The philosopher takes her views to be the result of this careful

Of course, I do endorse the claim that some of us moderns fit Nietzsche’s description well enough that that description
can explain a good deal of our behavior.
6 Cf., in addition to BGE 5, TI “The Problem of Socrates” 10-11, TI “’Reason’ in Philosophy” 1, and GM III: 12.
5
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investigation, rather than, say, of prejudice or whimsy. But, of course, this self-conception is hardly
forced on us. Philosophers could see themselves as deeply interested in the outcomes of their
inquiries, and they could take the objects of their inquiry to be unimportant trifles. Similarly, they could
think that certain of their views are the result of personal preferences rather than rigorous inquiry.
Views of these sorts are not unprecedented: Carnap (1931) and Wittgenstein (1953) have deflated
views about the significance of the objects of philosophical inquiry, and Rorty (1989) thinks that
certain philosophical views are owed more to one’s constitution than to careful deliberation. Given
that the self-conception Nietzsche describes is by no means necessary, he will want to ask why that
self-conception is nonetheless so widespread.
Nietzsche’s own view of philosophical activity is quite unlike the self-conception he attributes
to other philosophers. Where we take ourselves to be finding out how the world actually is,
Nietzsche sees us as doing little more than inflating and rationalizing our prejudices. So, for
example, Kant “saw himself obliged to posit an undemonstrable world, a logical ‘Beyond,’” in order
to “create room for his ‘moral realm’” (D 3). Similarly, Schopenhauer “used the Kantian formulation
of the aesthetic problem for his own purpose,” namely, “to break free from a torture” (GM III: 6). More
generally, “every great philosophy” has been “a confession of faith on the part of its author, and a
type of involuntary and unself-conscious memoir” (BGE 6). As Nietzsche sees it, a good deal of
philosophical activity amounts to nothing more than thinly veiled attempts to defend beliefs that
answer to peculiar psychological needs and to present the objects of those beliefs as deeply
important.7 But just as the self-conception Nietzsche ascribes to philosophers is not the only
possible one, it is far from obvious that philosophers must base their views on their own prejudices
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and desires. For surely some beliefs could be the result of careful investigation. So Nietzsche will
want to explain why philosophers in fact form their views in this way.8
Finally, whatever explanation Nietzsche provides ought to make sense of the disparity he
posits between philosophers’ view of themselves and their real activity; that is, it ought to make
sense of philosophers’ self-deception. Indeed, the sort of self-deception Nietzsche attributes to
philosophers is especially curious, since (as he views them) philosophers would be strongly inclined
to deny that they are self-deceived; they view themselves as the sort of people least likely to have
wildly inaccurate views of themselves. We should want, then, an explanation for the gap between
philosophers’ self-conception and their real behavior. For one thing, any gap this large between a
person’s self-conception and the truth about her calls for explanation. And for another, if
philosophical activity is nothing like philosophers’ view of it, we should wonder how that activity
could be satisfying for them.
2.2

Nietzsche’s Psychological Framework

In schematic form, Nietzsche’s explanation of the existence and nature of philosophical
activity runs as follows: the kind of person who engages in philosophical activity does so because
she has certain physiological and psychological characteristics. These and other psycho-physical
characteristics explain why they philosophize in the way he describes. So the interest of this
explanation lies largely in how exactly Nietzsche cashes out “certain physiological and psychological
characteristics.” As I read him, Nietzsche thinks that philosophers do what they do because of 1)
their will to power, which is common to all people, and 2) their psycho-physical constitution
(especially their set of drives) which serves to distinguish philosophers from other people and to

Here I skip over an important step in Nietzsche’s account of philosophers – namely, proof that philosophers really do
reason in the poor way he describes. Although Nietzsche himself provides various sorts of reasons to think that
philosophers are poor reasoners (a general skepticism about humans’ capacity for reason, specific arguments against
philosophical concepts or positions, genealogical debunkings of particular views, and so on), our focus is only on the
explanation of this phenomenon. I will, however, argue in Chapter 3 that philosophers are often poor reasoners.
8
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direct their will to power. I’ll explain each of these in turn, and then show how Nietzsche uses them
to explain philosophical activity.
I suggest that we understand the will to power as a name for the psychological hypothesis
that “every animal, thus also la bête philosophe, instinctively strives for an optimum of favorable
conditions under which it can vent its power completely and attain its maximum in the feeling of
power” (GM III: 7). Although there is some controversy about how universal Nietzsche takes the
will to power to be (whether, say, all physical things exhibit it, or just living things, or just animals), it
suffices for our purposes to note that Nietzsche certainly thinks all humans act according to the will
to power.9 Moreover, we will understand the will to power as just one drive among others, although
one that interacts with other drives in complex ways.
To understand how Nietzsche thinks the will to power guides action, it is necessary first to
understand what he takes power to be. I agree with commentators like Reginster (2007) and
Katsafanas (2013a) who deny that Nietzsche understands power as anything like control over others.
Instead, the conditions under which people are most powerful are “the truest and most natural
conditions of their best existence, of their most beautiful fruitfulness” (GM III: 8). One vents one’s
power completely when one productively makes use of all of one’s capacities for action. So as we’ll
understand the term, “power” more accurately describes an artist in the midst of creative activity
than, say, a bored politician. The will to power is an instinctive or subconscious tendency to seek out
the conditions under which one is best able to make use of one’s capacities for action. So Nietzsche
thinks that people will be drawn (whether they know it or not) toward situations, people, beliefs, and
roles that foster their ability to act as creatively and fruitfully as possible.

By way of support for this claim, note that the explanation of the prevalence of ascetic ideals Nietzsche gives in GM III
requires that all (or nearly all) people are motivated by a will to power. Further, Nietzsche claims that the will to power is
a feature of all life in BGE 13 and 259 and indeed that our world’s essence “is will to power” in BGE 186. So any
feasible interpretation of the will to power ought to extend the hypothesis at least to all humans, if not further.
9
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Nietzsche appeals to the will to power to explain a variety of psychological phenomena.
Perhaps the most detailed psychological explanation he offers in terms of the will to power comes in
GM III, where he explains the prevalence and tenacity of religions that promote an ascetic morality.
Nietzsche thinks that the fact “that the ascetic ideal has meant so much to man” (GM III: 1) is to be
explained by the fact that ascetic ideals allow sick individuals who suffer from life (on Nietzsche’s
view, the vast majority of people) to give meaning to their suffering and so attain a feeling of power.
Sick individuals who adopt ascetic ideals view their suffering as deserved, and so see self-flagellating
activity (i.e., activity intended to increase their feeling of suffering) as meaningful. This avenue for
meaningful activity allows those sick individuals to maximize their feeling of power.
How the will to power guides any particular individual’s actions will depend on the specific
capacities and nature of that individual. Nietzsche outlines the specific nature of philosophers in
large part by attributing a number of drives to them. Drives, as Nietzsche understands them, are
unconscious psychological forces that dispose us to act in certain ways. So, for instance, a drive “to
benevolence” (D 119) would dispose us to act benevolently. But note that drives are not merely
dispositions to behave in certain ways. Rather, they are psychological forces which influence our
desires and beliefs in order to bring about actions that will satisfy the drive. A drive to benevolence,
then, is not just a disposition to act benevolently. Instead, someone with a drive to benevolence
would be likely to interpret situations as calling for benevolent action; that is, the drive to
benevolence would influence her beliefs about her circumstances such that benevolent action
seemed appropriate or fitting (Katsafanas 2013b).
Nietzsche posits the existence of hundreds of drives (Katsafanas 2013b), so it is unsurprising
that he attributes a vast number of them to philosophers. At one point, he lists “the individual drives
and virtues of the philosopher one after the other—his doubting drive, his negating drive, his waitand-see (‘ephectic’) drive, his analytical drive, his exploring, searching, venturing drive, his
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comparing, balancing drive, his will to neutrality and objectivity, his will to every ‘sine ira et studio’...”
(GM III: 9). He also ascribes to philosophers a “will to contradiction and anti-nature” (GM III: 12)
and claims that “philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the
‘creation of the world,’ to the causa prima” (BGE 9). In addition, philosophers have a drive for
certainty (GS 347).
Although Nietzsche is not entirely clear about how philosophers acquire their drives, note
that they are not all entirely inborn. For instance, although philosophers exhibit drives to
contradiction and anti-nature, Nietzsche suggests that many of them have these drives only because
their other drives have led them to value the conditions of asceticism (e.g. lack of distractions,
freedom from disturbance, “good air”) and historical and psychological circumstances have led to an
association between the conditions of asceticism and the endorsement of ascetic ideals (GM III: 7-8).
Of course, Nietzsche’s view of philosophers’ psycho-physical constitution is not exhausted
by the list of drives he attributes to them. After all, as he often points out, the same drive can be
satisfied in a variety of different ways, so merely describing someone’s drives would not itself allow
us to completely explain her behavior. For instance, an ascetic priest and a philosopher may both
have a drive to anti-nature, but this drive would manifest itself differently in each case. Although
Nietzsche is less than ideally explicit about the psycho-physical facts about philosophers that
supplement his description of their drives, he notes that philosophers exhibit “inactive, brooding,
unwarriorlike elements” (GM III: 10), and he suggests that they are physically weak, and so inclined
to discharge their drives in the intellectual realm, rather than, say, through physical combat or
sport.10

Recall that I intend to claim neither that all philosophers are physically weak nor that Nietzsche thinks that all of them
are. This rather broad sketch of philosophers’ psycho-physical traits merely describes a paradigmatic type.
10
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2.3

Nietzsche’s Explanation of Philosophers

So how does Nietzsche use this framework to explain philosophical activity?11 Recall the first
question we wanted his account of philosophers to answer: why is it that philosophers view
themselves as careful and objective inquirers after deep and important truths? Parts of this selfconception can now be explained by appeal to philosophers’ will to power. Philosophers inflate their
view of the process and products of their labor because this inflated view makes them feel more
productive and fruitful. Viewing their inquiries as rigorous gives philosophers a view of their activity
as difficult and distinguished, and viewing the results of those inquiries as of the utmost importance
for human lives similarly magnifies the apparent value of the work they are already inclined to do.
Philosophers’ view of themselves as objective, however, is better explained by the particular
drives that they have than their general will to power. On Nietzsche’s view, philosophers’
conception of their inquiries as objective requires the view that they can silence these personal drives
and access reality as it is in itself, such that “no falsification [takes] place from either the side of the
subject or the side of the object” (BGE 16). Philosophers aspire to an ideal of objectivity that entails
that they prevent any irrelevant facts about themselves from interfering with the formation of their
beliefs; and they implicitly judge all facts about themselves to be irrelevant.
As Jessica Berry explains in her “Perspectivism and Ephexis in Interpretation” (in Berry
2011), the philosopher’s aspirations to be objective are merely an epistemic variation on the ascetic
priest’s aspirations to not exist at all. “Just as the ascetic priest adopts a highest ideal that calls for his
own annihilation (qua flesh-and-blood human being),” she remarks, “the ascetic thinker or
philosopher adopts a highest ideal that calls for his own annihilation (qua thinker).” Where the

The explanation I’ll present in what follows is better viewed as a rational reconstruction that synthesizes stray
comments of Nietzsche’s with his general psychological explanatory framework than as a summary of an explanation he
himself offers. As far as I am aware, Nietzsche never sets out to explain philosophers’ behavior in the explicit, step-bystep manner I attempt here.
11
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ascetic priest views his existence as a source of guilt, an error, and something that must be made up
for, the philosopher views his contribution to cognition as a source of error and falsification. Both
types fabricate an ideal of self-annihilation, with the philosopher sublimating this basic drive to be
rid of herself into the epistemic realm.
Why would philosophers adopt an ideal of this sort? Nietzsche offers two possible
explanations. First, philosophers may be attracted to ascetic ideals for the same reasons that other
sick individuals are – adopting those ideals gives them a way to express their power insofar as they
can cause themselves to suffer and view that suffering as meaningful. Second, philosophers may be
attracted to ascetic ideals because the conditions ascetic ideals praise (poverty, chastity, and solitude)
are also the conditions most conducive to philosophical activity (GM III: 7-8). Philosophers are
attracted to ascetic ideals because those ideals increase their feeling of power, and they thereby form
the desire for self-annihilation characteristic of those ideals.
So much for philosophers’ view of themselves. Nietzsche’s account should also explain why
philosophers act the way that they do, or why they so often simply rationalize and inflate their own
prejudices. The central piece of Nietzsche’s explanation for philosophers’ poor reasoning, it seems
to me, is his claim that “the falsest judgments...are the most indispensable to us,” that “a
renunciation of false judgments would be a renunciation of life” (BGE 4). Nietzsche thinks the
stock of beliefs that is most conducive to an organism’s flourishing is not determined by what is true,
but rather by the idiosyncratic needs of the organism in question. Humans, he claims, could not live
“without measuring reality against the wholly invented world of the unconditioned and self-identical,
without a constant falsification of the world through numbers” (BGE 4). Similarly, “the doctrine of
the freedom of will has human pride and feeling of power for its father and mother” (D 128).
Indeed, many of our basic beliefs, e.g. “that there are identical things, that there are things…that a
thing is what it appears to be” are held because they are conducive to our flourishing (GS 110).
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So, on this way of explaining things, philosophers are prone to reason in favor of their own
prejudices because holding those prejudices maximizes their feeling of power and helps satisfy their
drives. Certain metaphysical and moral beliefs make philosophers feel more powerful by, say,
inflating their view of their significance in the world; a belief that humans are metaphysically distinct
from non-human animals or that they have a special kind of dignity might serve this purpose.
Similarly, holding particular beliefs makes one more likely to act in ways that will satisfy certain
drives. A negating drive or a will to contradiction will be much more likely to be satisfied if one
views oneself or one’s physical, worldly existence as insignificant. Nietzsche offers a diagnosis of
Schopenhauer’s pessimism along these lines (GM III: 6-7). In the same way, philosophers’ drives to
analyze and explore can be satisfied only if they think that they have some degree of epistemic access
to the objects of their inquiry, so they will be inclined to reject many varieties of skepticism.12 Note,
however, that Nietzsche does not think that philosophers consciously endorse any line of reasoning
like “if skepticism is false, then I can satisfy my drives to analysis and exploring, so skepticism must
be false.” Rather, philosophers’ will to power and drives subconsciously lead them both to favor
apparently legitimate lines of reasoning that support beliefs that are conducive to the satisfaction of
their drives and the enhancement of their feeling of power, and to avoid or reject lines of reasoning
that oppose those beliefs.
Finally, we want Nietzsche’s account to explain why it is that philosophers’ view of
themselves and their actual activity lie so far apart. In broad strokes, the explanation is that a view of
oneself and one’s activities need not be accurate in order to maximize power or satisfy one’s drives.
Philosophers happen to be so constituted that false beliefs about themselves and their activities
better satisfy their psychological needs, and so they are drawn to those beliefs. Although there is

I take Nietzsche’s mockery of Kant’s “discovery” of “the faculty of synthetic judgments a priori” and of “the young
theologians of the Tübingen seminary” in BGE 11 to express a point along these lines.
12
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evidence available to philosophers that their self-conception is inaccurate, philosophers ignore or
downplay the significance of that evidence because acknowledging it would lower their feeling of
power and make it harder to satisfy their drives.
We may also wonder how philosophers would be satisfied by performing an activity whose
nature they grossly misunderstand. Shouldn’t they become disillusioned with philosophy when it
fails to provide the goods they thought it would, i.e., true beliefs about the most important matters?
Note first that philosophers do not realize that philosophy fails to meet their desires; on the
inaccurate view of the discipline they have, their inquiries really do yield true beliefs. But recall that
philosophers are not, on Nietzsche’s view, in fact motivated to philosophize because they want true
beliefs. Rather they want to maximize their feeling of power and satisfy their drives. These desiderata
are nicely satisfied by philosophical activity, whether or not philosophers are aware of it. So there is
no reason to expect philosophers to come to be disillusioned with philosophical activity.
In short, then, Nietzsche thinks that philosophers have a radically inflated self-conception
that is at odds with their actual activity because they are so constituted that such a disparity
maximizes their feeling of power and satisfies their drives. Philosophers’ inaccurate self-conception
allows them to reap the psychological benefits of viewing themselves as careful, rigorous, and
disinterested seekers after deeply significant truths while at bottom they do little more than reason
poorly in favor of their own prejudices and inclinations.
3

DIAGNOSING METAPHYSICAL OPTIMISM

In this chapter, I’ll argue that because Nietzsche’s diagnosis of philosophers can explain a
particular variety of poor reasoning on the part of philosophers, we have reason to think that that
diagnosis is true of many philosophers. Although I think Nietzsche’s account can help explain a
good deal of poor philosophical reasoning, I concern myself here only with one sort of such
reasoning, namely metaphysical optimism. I’ll call anyone who takes an irrelevant fact about humans to
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tell us something important about a feature of metaphysical reality a metaphysical optimist. I’ll argue
1) that many philosophers are metaphysical optimists, 2) that metaphysical optimism calls for
explanation, and 3) that Nietzsche’s psychological account of philosophers offers the best
explanation of metaphysical optimism, and so we have reason to take that account to be true.
3.1

Some Cases of Metaphysical Optimism

Some philosophers think, or sometimes act like they think, that a variety of irrelevant facts
about human behaviors, desires, needs, and capacities are accurate guides to how things are with
nonhuman reality. For instance, as Nietzsche says, some people think that lofty feelings are a guide
to truth (A 12). Using my terminology, such philosophers are metaphysical optimists: they think that
some fact about humans tells us something about metaphysical reality, when in fact it does not.
As I’m defining the term, a charge of metaphysical optimism ought to come with both a
specification of the parochial fact about humans that the accused takes to tell us something about
metaphysical reality and an argument that that parochial fact tells us no such thing. For that reason,
exactly outlining the extension of the term “metaphysical optimism” would entail a good deal of
heavy-duty metaphysical and epistemological argumentation showing just which facts about us
humans tell us something about metaphysical reality. While it lies beyond the scope of this thesis to
carry out that work in full, I’ll try to illustrate the phenomenon by arguing that a few particular
examples constitute cases of metaphysical optimism and that similar examples are common.
Here’s the first symptom of metaphysical optimism that I think philosophers manifest: some
philosophers think, wrongly, that if humans quantify over some entities, we have reason to think
that those entities exist. I don’t mean to claim that our quantifying over entities never gives us reason
to think that those entities exist. Rather, I think that there are some putative entities that are so
constituted that, contra certain philosophers, our quantifying over them would not give us reason to
think that they exist. Past and future (or non-present) entities are two examples of such entities.
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The structure of certain arguments in the philosophy of time shows that some philosophers
think that quantification over non-present entities would be evidence that they exist. Consider one
argument against presentism: presentism is implausible because it has a hard time making sense of
singular propositions about non-present entities. On the presentist view, there is no entity referred
to in sentences like “Socrates was snub-nosed,” since the only plausible entity would be Socrates,
who is non-present, and therefore does not exist. But since many singular propositions about nonpresent entities are true, presentism must be false.
Of course, presentists have responded to arguments of this type in a variety of ways. For
instance, they have devised paraphrase schemes that purport to show how we can interpret these
sentences without requiring them to refer to non-present entities. Luckily for us, we don’t need to
analyze the success of these responses. Instead, I’ll try to show how the argument assumes a link
between human behavior and the metaphysical truth that is just not there.
For the argument in question to go through, there must be evidence in favor of the truth of
singular propositions about non-present entities. Otherwise, it would hardly count against
presentism that it entails (or seems to entail) that such propositions are false. So why might someone
think that singular propositions about non-present entities are likely to be true? I think that many
people believe this simply because we humans assert so many singular propositions about nonpresent entities. Since we attribute properties to particular historical or future individuals all the time,
one might think that there is a presumption in favor of the correctness of such attributions. While I
doubt that many philosophers would explicitly endorse this line of reasoning, I nonetheless suspect
that it underlies the force of the argument we are considering.
Here’s one reason to think metaphysicians think that people uttering non-presentist
sentences is a reason to think those sentences are true: such deference to common usage often
figures in metaphysical debates over the existence of entities. For instance, Van Inwagen (1990)
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offers a paraphrase scheme according to which folk sentences like “there are statues” are just loose
talk for “there are mereological simples arranged statuewise.” This paraphrase scheme allows him to
square his view that there are no (non-living) composite objects with folk linguistic practices that
seem to endorse the existence of such objects. In the same vein, it is commonly considered a virtue
of mereological universalism (the view that any two objects compose a third object) that it can
account for the existence of composite objects typically posited by the folk. Since metaphysicians
regularly take folk belief to provide at least prima facie evidence in favor of other metaphysical views,
it is likely that they presume that we have prima facie reason to take folk speech and belief about nonpresent entities to be accurate.
Moreover, defenders of presentism typically feel a pull to show how their view can be
squared with common usage. For instance, Ted Sider (1999) attempts to defend presentism against
the aforementioned objection while adhering to the following constraint: “the presentist should not
completely reject ordinary talk and thought. The presentist should salvage something from what we
commonly say… A presentist who completely rejected masses of ordinary talk as just being
confused would be a quite radical skeptic.” Similarly, Ned Markosian (2004) claims that the “typical
English speaker on the street” would, on reflection, agree that the paraphrase Markosian offers for
non-presentist sentences correctly captures her view of the meaning of those sentences. He takes her
agreement to show that a particular (presentist-friendly) understanding of the truth-conditions of
discourse about non-present objects is accurate. Each of these philosophers thinks that the
presentist’s account of non-presentist sentences ought to be compatible with the speech and beliefs
of ordinary speakers. That their accounts are so constrained suggests that they think that ordinary
speech and thought give us reason to think the metaphysical fact of the matter is one way or
another. That is, they think that if presentism could not be squared with how people ordinary talk
and think, that would be a reason to think presentism was false.

18
So some, although of course not all, metaphysicians think that the prevalence of singular
propositions about non-present objects gives us reason to think that some such propositions are
true. But for the prevalence of these propositions to be evidence in favor of their truth, there would
need to be an appropriate connection between their prevalence and their truth. For instance,
perhaps their prevalence would simply constitute their truth, or their truth would be the best
explanation of their prevalence. To better understand this connection, let us make the following
stipulation: we will only consider those iterations of the argument in question that take it that the
truth of presentism is a mind-independent metaphysical matter that is true regardless of human
attitudes. On this view, it is not the case that presentism is true merely because we use an existence
predicate that does not extend to non-present entities. Instead, presentism is an independent truth
about the structure of reality. I take it that most philosophers engaged in arguments over presentism
accept this latter characterization of the matter.13 But if the status of presentism is a mindindependent matter about the metaphysical structure of reality, then the prevalence of singular
propositions about non-present objects does not give any reason to think that presentism is false.
The truth or falsity of presentism does not figure in the causal story explaining the
prevalence of non-presentist utterances. That is to say, even if presentism were false, the existence of
non-present objects would not be responsible for the utterances humans make that seem to refer to
those objects. The causal story for any given utterance will include only garden-variety facts about
the formation of languages, a person’s ends and beliefs, and so on. So the prevalence of nonpresentist utterances fails to be evidence against presentism in at least one way: that prevalence is
not causally explained by the existence of non-present objects.

The following argument, then, does not show that philosophers who do think that presentism’s truth is constituted by
facts about our linguistic behavior are metaphysical optimists.
13
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Why else might the facts about human speech behavior suggest that presentism is false? It’s
not as though the falsity of presentism deductively follows from the ordinary facts about what
people utter. That humans make noises that sound like singular propositions about non-present
objects is not logically incompatible with the claim that there are no non-present objects. Similarly,
it’s not as though the prevalence of non-presentist utterances makes it more likely that presentism is
false: finding ourselves in a world where some creatures utter apparent singular propositions about
non-present objects doesn’t suggest that the necessary structure of time across all worlds is one way
or another. For certainly we could just as well have found ourselves in a world where creatures don’t
utter the problematic propositions, regardless of the truth or falsity of presentism.
So it seems unlikely that the prevalence of singular propositions about non-present objects
gives us reason to think that presentism is false: the truth or falsity of presentism is entirely divorced
from the facts about human linguistic behavior. Nonetheless, some philosophers act as if human
linguistic behavior constitutes evidence against presentism. In my terminology, these philosophers
are (or at least act like) metaphysical optimists.
Here’s the second symptom of metaphysical optimism that I think philosophers manifest:
they explicitly or implicitly endorse the claim that if we humans or philosophers have strong
prudential reason to take some metaphysical thesis to be true (or false), that thesis is likely to be true
(or false). While there may be some cases in which this line of reasoning is correct, I’ll argue that
philosophers endorse it in cases in which it is not correct.
The first example of this sort of optimism I’ll cite involves taking a metaphysical thesis to be
false precisely because as humans or agents we have strong reason to take that thesis to be false.
Sharon Street (unpublished ms.) thinks that realism about reasons is false because every practical
standpoint is committed to the rejection of realism. I’ll first explain why she seems to think this, and
then I’ll explain why it’s false.
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In her “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Rethink It,” Street offers an argument against
normative realism, which she defines as “the view that there are at least some normative facts or
truths that hold independently of all our evaluative attitudes.” On her antirealist view, any normative
reason an agent has to  “must somehow follow from within her own practical point of view.”
Where the realist takes us to have at least some reasons independently of our evaluative attitudes, the
antirealist thinks the only reasons we have are those that are entailed by our practical standpoint.
Street’s argument against realism runs as follows. Realism about reasons entails that in all
likelihood we are hopeless when it comes to recognizing what reasons we have, since our normative
judgments are shaped by causal forces that we have no reason to think would track the normative
truth. For instance, Street (2006) thinks that many of our moral beliefs can be causally traced back to
evolutionary pressures; that is, we hold many of the moral beliefs we do because holding those
beliefs was conducive to our survival and reproduction. But there is no reason for the realist to think
that those evolutionary pressures would track the moral truth. After all, it is not as though the
independent facts of the matter about what is morally right and wrong had any causal bearing on
those evolutionary pressures. So the realist ought to think that his normative judgments have been
shaped by forces that have nothing to do with the normative truth, and so he is in all likelihood
hopeless when it comes to recognizing what reasons he has. But, Street thinks, since every agent
makes some normative judgments, every agent is committed to thinking that they are not hopeless at
recognizing what reasons they have. Since realism entails that we are so hopeless, we must reject it.
This argument is perfectly valid, as far as it goes: if we agents are committed to rejecting
anything that would entail that we cannot recognize what our reasons are, and normative realism
entails that we cannot recognize what our reasons are, then we are committed to rejecting realism.
However, that every agent is committed to rejecting realism does not entail that realism is false. The
truth of realism is at least logically compatible with it being the case that every (possible or actual)
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agent has a decisive reason to reject realism. For instance, it might be the case that every agent has
attitude-independent reason to view herself as capable of recognizing what her reasons are and that
she therefore has attitude-independent reason to reject the truth of realism.
Nonetheless, one might think that realism is at least unlikely to be true in light of the fact
that all agents are committed to rejecting it. I’ll argue that this is not the case. Consider the following
case. Suppose it were merely a contingent fact that some agents were committed to rejecting realism:
some agents, given their ends, desires, and beliefs, would have to reject realism, but some agents
would not be so constituted as to have to reject realism. Would the instantiation of some evaluative
profiles that were committed to rejecting realism constitute evidence that realism was false? The
answer, it seems to me, is no. For the truth of realism does not itself bear on the kind of evaluative
profiles that happen to be instantiated in the world. There is no reason to expect that, if realism were
true, there simply could not be any creatures with values that gave them reason to reject realism. The
forces guiding the kinds of creatures that appear in the world are presumably only ground-level
causal forces; those causal forces are not themselves sensitive to the truth of realism, so there would
be no reason to expect them to be different were realism true.
Now consider Street’s original case. Does the fact that every valuing creature is committed
to rejecting realism show that realism is false? Again, it seems to me that the answer is no. For just as
we would not expect the truth of realism to bear on the sorts of evaluative profiles that exist in the
world, we shouldn’t expect the truth of realism to bear on the relationship agents must take
themselves to have with their reasons. That is, it’s not the case that if realism were true, then agents
would not be committed to rejecting realism: realism would still be unacceptable on the grounds that
it would entail that we are hopeless when it comes to knowing our reasons. The truth of realism
doesn’t have an impact on the relationship agents must take themselves to have with their reasons.
So that we find ourselves committed to rejecting realism does not suggest that realism is in fact false.
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So Street gives a general example of the sort of reasoning I mean to highlight here: she
pinpoints a fact about what all agents must think about their reasons and concludes that, since all
agents must reject realism, realism must be false. However, this line of reasoning does not always take
as its starting point a matter so grand as the necessary features of agency. Philosophers, I think,
often take professional benefits to be arguments in favor of views. For instance, sometimes
philosophers think (or at least act like they think) that, because a claim must be true for certain kinds
of inquiry to proceed, that claim is probably true. Ted Sider gives a clear example of this more
parochial strain of metaphysical optimism.
In his Writing the Book of the World, Sider introduces the notion of structure and uses it to
make sense of a variety of debates in contemporary metaphysics. For our purposes, it will be
sufficient to understand structure as having two features. First, it is a sentence operator that picks
out the parts of reality that are most fundamental, or real, or genuine. Second, it can be applied to
any part of speech, including (and importantly for our purposes) sentence operators. So for any
given term, logical operator, concept, etc., we can ask “Is it structural?” If and only if the item in
question makes up part of the fundamental furniture of the world, then it is structural. So notions
like charge, mass, and the existential quantifier are probably structural, whereas notions like grue,
city, and “the” are probably not structural.
At one point, Sider considers “extreme realism” about structure. That is, he asks whether
“structure” is itself structural. This amounts to asking whether structure is part of the basic furniture
of the world, whether it carves reality at its joints, and so on. Sider argues that our options are to
“either adopt extreme realism about structure…or else give up altogether on explanations that
invoke structure, which is tantamount to giving up on structure itself.” Sider’s choice, unsurprisingly,
“is for the former” (140).
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Sider’s argument for extreme realism runs as follows.
The status of metaphysics itself hangs on this choice. In their loftiest moments,
metaphysicians think of themselves as engaged in a profoundly important and foundational
intellectual enterprise. But if fundamentality is highly disjunctive, the field of metaphysics
itself—which is delineated by its focus on fundamental questions—would be an arbitrarily
demarcated one (140).
Sider summarizes the upshot of his argument, claiming that “the argument for saying that structure
is structural was that this is needed to insure that structure can take part in genuine explanations.”
Just so, he also holds that extreme realism about structure “offers explanatory power (and a pleasing
self-conception for metaphysicians)” (140).
Here Sider gives two distinct arguments. First, he thinks that since structure must be
structural to figure in genuine explanations, structure must be structural. The quality of this
argument will hinge on the evidence we have that structure does in fact figure in genuine
explanations. If we have such evidence, Sider’s argument would seem sound. If we have no evidence
suggesting that structure does figure in genuine explanations, but merely a desire that it does, Sider’s
argument would be poor. Of course, Sider spends the bulk of Writing the Book of the World arguing
that structure does figure in genuine explanations, so this first argument seems strong.
The second argument Sider offers is that if structure were not structural, then metaphysics
would be an arbitrarily demarcated discipline, and for that reason not a “profoundly important and
foundational intellectual enterprise.” Again, the quality of this argument hinges on the quality of the
evidence we have that metaphysics is not an arbitrarily demarcated discipline and that it is a
profoundly important and foundational intellectual enterprise. But, unlike the argument for
structure’s explanatory power, Sider does not offer independent reason to think that metaphysics is
important and not arbitrarily demarcated. That is, he does not give reasons to support the “pleasing

24
self-conception” extreme realism offers metaphysicians. For this reason, this second argument
displays a kind of metaphysical optimism: Sider endorses a view in part because endorsing that view
offers him (and other metaphysicians) some prudential value, even though its offering prudential
value does not give evidence to think reality is one way or another.
So much for this second brand of metaphysical optimism. The third and final sort of
optimism I’ll discuss is as follows. Philosophers sometimes think, wrongly, that a metaphysical
claim’s making good sense of human behavior or language gives us reason to think that that claim is
true. Again, I don’t think that arguments of this shape always fail, but rather that philosophers
sometimes make arguments of this shape that do fail. David Lewis’s argument for modal realism in
On The Plurality of Worlds seems to me to be just such an argument.
Here’s a rough outline of Lewis’s argument for modal realism, or the claim that possible
worlds other than the actual world exist just as concretely as the actual world. Lewis poses the
question to himself, “Why believe in a plurality of worlds?” and answers it, too, “Because the
hypothesis is serviceable, and that is a reason to think that it is true” (3). Accepting modal realism
greatly simplifies our ideology and allows us to make sense of a variety of notions that might have
looked primitive. Indeed, we “improve the unity and economy of the theory that is our professional
concern – total theory, the whole of what we take to be true” (4). And Lewis offers an argument that
this is the best way to help ourselves to these benefits: no other way of conceiving of possible
worlds does so with the economy and simplicity of modal realism. So we ought to believe, literally
and sincerely, in a plurality of worlds.
Although explanatory power can be reason to think that some claim is true, I think that the
putative explananda of modal realism are such that its explanatory power would not be a reason to
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think that it is true. That is, I think that explaining our concepts of modality, counterfactuals, mental
and verbal content, and properties14 is not evidence in favor of modal realism.
Here is one reason for thinking this. The notions that can be best explained by modal
realism are notions we acquired without ever coming into contact with the things that would make
modal realism true, i.e. other worlds. But without such a causal link, it seems to be a matter of total
happenstance that our concept of modality15 works in a way best explained by the existence of other
worlds rather than by some other theory. But if it is just happenstance that our concepts work this
way, it seems that we are not entitled to take on the ontological baggage intrinsic to the theory that
best explains those concepts. For we might have had other concepts best explained by some other
theory without the status of modal realism altering one way or another.
Here's another way of making this point. If modal realism is true, there are other possible
worlds containing people who speak languages much like ours, except that their talk about modality
is substantially different. Indeed, for some of these people, their talk about modality will be so
different that some theory other than modal realism will provide the best explanation of it.
Moreover, in some cases, this other theory will entail the rejection of modal realism.16
The people with exotic systems of modality, it seems to me, are not licensed to think that the
theory that best explains their talk about modality is actually true. But since we are in the same
epistemic predicament with respect to possible worlds as they are, we are not licensed to think that
the theory that best explains our talk about modality is actually true. The principle that theories
which best explain our concepts are likely to be true has two flaws in this case. First, it can just as

These four notions are the ones that Lewis uses modal realism to explain.
I’ll use “modality” as a placeholder for all of the notions Lewis thinks modal realism best explains. Not much turns on
which of these explananda we take for our example.
16 Perhaps “talk about modality” that is so exotic that it is not explained by the theory that explains our talk of modality is
not properly called talk about modality at all. However, I’m not sure this point can be used to defend Lewis’s argument: it
would need to be the case that this exotic modality-resembling talk is so distinct from our modal talk that its
practitioners aren’t justified in accepting the theory that best explains that talk. Since I don’t think this is entailed merely
by its not being modal talk, I don’t think that this point can by itself salvage Lewis’s argument.
14
15
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well lead us into error as into truth; people with exotic systems of modality who apply this principle
will systematically come to false conclusions. Second, the principle draws a conclusion about
nonhuman reality based on a phenomenon that is utterly insensitive to the way this part of
nonhuman reality is. Possible worlds are just as likely to be populated by people with exotic systems
of modality when modal realism is true as when it is false. But that the system of modality people
happen to have is insensitive to whether or not modal realism is true just suggests that our having
the system of modality we have gives no reason to think that modal realism is true.
So, again, we can conclude that this argument for a metaphysical truth rests on an overly
optimistic understanding of the relation between human activities and nonhuman reality. If the only
thing going for modal realism is that it does the best job of explaining our system of modality, we do
not have much reason to believe it. For, just as the modal realist thinks there is nothing special about
the actual world except that it's the world we happen to inhabit, there is nothing special about our
system of modality except that it's the system we happen to use. But the fact that we happen to use
this system is no reason to think that the theory behind that system is in special touch with
nonhuman reality.
So much, then, for specific examples of metaphysical optimism. I’ll now argue that this
phenomenon calls for explanation and offer the Nietzschean explanation I favor.
3.2

The Prevalence of Metaphysical Optimism

In the last section, I gave examples of three different varieties of metaphysical optimism.
First, philosophers sometimes think, wrongly, that our quantifying over certain entities gives reason
to think that those entities exist. Second, philosophers sometimes think, wrongly, that if it is
prudentially valuable to accept a certain claim, then that claim is likely to be true. Third,
philosophers sometimes think, wrongly, that a metaphysical view’s ability to explain certain facts
about human behavior or language is a reason to think that that view is correct.
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As mentioned, I don’t think that the structure of these arguments is in itself problematic.
Indeed, my own argument tries to support a view by showing that it can explain certain facts about
human behavior. I do think, however, that the examples I cited of poor uses of these argument
forms are not just rare outliers. Philosophers frequently make poor arguments of the foregoing type.
In favor of this claim, first note that arguments with these shapes are quite common. The
guiding claim in the argument against presentism – that there is a presumption against a view that
implies that something we appear to quantify over does not exist – figures in a variety of
philosophical debates, such as arguments against expressivism and error theory about moral
discourse, arguments against various forms of nominalism, and arguments against mereological
nihilism.17 Similarly, Street’s argument that normative realism is false because all agents are
committed to rejecting it is mirrored in a number of other ethical and metaethical debates, e.g., in
Korsgaard’s (1996) argument for constitutivism and Cuneo’s (2007) argument against an error
theory about epistemic reasons. Although few philosophers are as candid as Sider when he opts to
accept extreme realism about structure partly because it provides “a pleasing self-conception for
metaphysicians,” arguments of much the same sort are common, for instance when philosophers
suggest that a view is false because it implies skepticism, whether globally or about a particular
domain.18 Finally, the spirit of Lewis’s argument for modal realism, viz. the belief that a
philosophical theory that explains theoretical notions well is likely to be true, is similarly ubiquitous,
showing up in, e.g., Lewis’s argument for his view of properties and arguments for platonism in
mathematics.19

See, e.g., Korman (2009) on “the challenge from folk belief” generally, Shafer-Landau (2003) for arguments against
expressivism and error theory, and Dorr and Rosen (2002) for a (critical) discussion of arguments against mereological
nihilism from common sense.
18 See, e.g., Van Inwagen (1990) for a worry about mereological nihilism on the grounds that rejecting the existence of
ordinary objects means rejecting a “Universal Belief,” which entails radical skepticism, Benacerraf (1973) and responses
to same for arguments for and against views in mathematics in light of their potentially skeptical consequences, and
Chalmers (1996) for an argument against epiphenomenalism in light of its skeptical consequences.
19 See, e.g., Lewis (1983) on properties, and Swoyer (2008) on platonism.
17
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Of course, that arguments with these forms are common does not show that bad arguments
with these forms are common. Nonetheless, I think that the prevalence of this sort of argument
suggests that metaphysical optimism is widespread. For neither the domains nor the people I’ve
singled out for discussion seem to be special in a way that would make them more likely to manifest
metaphysical optimism than other domains or people. It is not as though, say, the philosophy of
time just attracts bad arguments or Lewis was ignorant of common standards of rigor. So it seems
improbable that arguments of the mentioned kind are improper only in the cases I’ve just examined.
So I think that we have good reason to think that metaphysical optimism is widespread, i.e.,
that many philosophers make arguments that assume links between nonhuman reality and human
behaviors, preferences, and capacities that are just not there. Although there may be fewer cases
than I suppose, it is unlikely that the instances I’ve adduced are just isolated incidents. Given that
this phenomenon is widespread, I think that it calls for explanation. In the rest of this section, I’ll
offer a Nietzschean explanation of metaphysical optimism.
3.3

The Nietzschean Explanation of Metaphysical Optimism

I think that many philosophers are (or act like) metaphysical optimists because doing so, in
Nietzsche’s terminology, increases their feeling of power and satisfies their drives. That is to say,
acting in accordance with the belief that human behaviors, preferences, and capacities are hooked up
with the metaphysical structure of the world allows philosophers to work more productively, makes
possible “a pleasing self-conception,” and satisfies their needs for certainty, control, and objectivity.
According to this explanation, the prevalence of metaphysical optimism is not to be
explained by any evidence in favor of that viewpoint; indeed, we typically have good reason to think,
for any particular instance of optimism, that the assumed connection between nonhuman reality and
human activity does not really exist. Rather, philosophers have strong arational motivation, given the
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facts about their constitution, to assume links between metaphysical matters and human behavior
that are not really there.
Recall Nietzsche’s general description of philosophers’ psychological needs: we need to feel
as though we have carefully reached certainty about the deepest nature of reality. We feel more
powerful to the extent that we work productively to satisfy these needs, and we instinctively strive
toward the conditions that will make us feel the most powerful. Given these needs, there will be
strong pressure toward views that make metaphysical inquiry possible and productive. For instance,
a globally skeptical epistemology ought to be anathema to the philosophical type, since this would
straightforwardly preclude serious metaphysical inquiry.
Metaphysical optimism is attractive to philosophers in part because it makes possible certain
routes of metaphysical inquiry. The more links we take there to be between ourselves and the
objects of metaphysical study, the more potential avenues we have for investigating those objects.
So, for instance, the belief that our talking about certain objects is a prima facie reason to think that
those objects exist gives metaphysicians an epistemic foothold into a variety of domains. Since
philosophical inquiry is facilitated by philosophers’ belief that we have epistemic access into
metaphysical matters, metaphysical optimism is directly conducive to our will to power.
These direct epistemic benefits, however, are not the only advantages of metaphysical
optimism. Indeed, if the only thing speaking in favor of metaphysical optimism were its epistemic
benefits, it would likely not be so common, since philosophers reject plenty of other views that
would imply they had good access to the objects of metaphysical inquiry. Rather, the belief in these
sorts of connections is tied to a general outlook, a “pleasing self-conception,” that philosophers
have strong motivation not to give up.
As Nietzsche describes it, the philosopher “sees on all sides the eyes of the universe
telescopically focused upon his action and thought” (TL). Such a view of oneself is a natural result
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of the philosopher’s will to power, her “tyrannical drive” (BGE 9) and her “metaphysical need” (HH
I 26). The philosopher is driven to posit herself as a uniquely important piece of existence, and this
view of herself lends itself easily to the belief that her “action and thought,” since they are her action
and thought, are hooked up with reality itself.
Metaphysical optimism, then, is both epistemically desirable and personally flattering. Street’s
argument against normative realism demonstrates these features well. Street argued that realism is
false because all agents must reject realism, and this because all agents are committed to the view
that they can detect their reasons, which view is incompatible with realism. The link Street posits
between agents’ necessary commitments and the real nature of their reasons is of obvious epistemic
utility; indeed, Street posits this link precisely because it is needed to escape skepticism about our
reasons. By hooking up our reasons with ground-level facts about the conditions which make it
possible for us to act, Street ensures that we have a method for detecting our reasons. Moreover,
Street’s view demonstrates the confidence that the universe is “telescopically focused” upon our
action and thought. The necessary conditions for our behavior are not just contingent facts about a
particular class of organism, but rather guides to the nature of normativity itself.
In a nutshell, then, metaphysical optimism is common in philosophy because philosophers
are creatures who are unconsciously motivated to feel as though they’ve reached certainty about the
deepest truths of reality. The belief that various human desires, activities, and needs are accurate
guides to the nature of nonhuman reality gives philosophers the sense that they can figure out how
reality is in itself and supports their self-conception as uniquely important beings, as “causa prima”
(BGE 9). These prudential benefits are too good for philosophers to pass up.
3.4

The Baggage of the Nietzschean Explanation

The Nietzschean account of philosophers may seem implausible, and indeed for a variety of
reasons. For one thing, we might doubt that anything like the will to power is really a guiding force
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in human behavior. Next, we might not think that philosophers have the particular psychological
profile Nietzsche ascribes to them. Further, we might not be convinced that the psychological
profile of philosophers informs their philosophical views. Finally, we might not think that
metaphysical optimism is the sort of view philosophers would be attracted to.
I’d like to view these considerations not as objections to the Nietzschean account, but rather as
indicators of the commitments we take on board if we accept it. Whether taking on these
commitments is worth the explanatory benefits will depend both on the weight of the commitments
themselves and the quality of their explanatory benefits. I’ll argue that the baggage of the
Nietzschean account is not so heavy, and the explanatory work it does is hard to accomplish with
other means, so we should be happy to take on the commitments of that account. I’ll begin by trying
to assuage worries about the account’s commitments.
The centerpiece of the Nietzschean account is its assertion that human behavior is in large
part guided by a will to power, i.e., that people act such that they can feel maximally productive and
significant. Without this piece of the account, we would lack an explanation as to why philosophers
are attracted to views that are conducive to metaphysical inquiry. While it is hardly feasible to defend
such a broad thesis here, some considerations might make it more palatable. Note that Nietzsche is
plausibly read as offering the will to power hypothesis as a competitor to psychological hedonism.
That is, he thinks that we can’t make sense of human behavior just by appeal to a desire for pleasure;
we also need to appeal to a need for creative and fruitful activity. Positing a will to power helps
makes sense of a number of phenomena, including boredom’s motivational force, our willingness to
pursue difficult courses of action regardless of the pleasure they’ll bring, and (of special importance
for Nietzsche) the popularity of ascetic religions. Positing (beside other desires) a general desire to
feel productive and significant helps explain much human behavior, so we ought to posit it.
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Next, Nietzsche’s account includes a remarkably detailed psychology of philosophers.
However, the explanation of metaphysical optimism does not require that everything Nietzsche said
about philosophers is true of every philosopher; it is not particularly important for our purposes
whether the diagnoses Nietzsche made of figures like Plato and Kant were accurate, nor whether all
philosophers are laboring under the delusions of morality. It will suffice for our purposes if
philosophers have a metaphysical need, a drive to tyrannize, a need for certainty, and an inflated selfconception. Moreover, not all philosophers need to have this psychological profile; our account
extends only to those who show signs of metaphysical optimism.
Two considerations make these psychological claims plausible. First, it is easy to see how
individuals with motivations like these would be attracted to philosophy, and difficult to see how
individuals without these motivations would be. Those attracted to philosophy (and metaphysics in
particular) are likely to be the sort of individuals who want to find the truth about deep questions,
since that’s precisely what philosophers are advertised as doing.20 And professional philosophy does
not seem to be an attractive career for those not interested in those questions: it is not as though it
pays particularly well or comes with much prestige. Second, metaphilosophical trends and empirical
studies suggest that many philosophers are as Nietzsche describes. For instance, the turn away from
linguistic philosophy is plausibly construed as a rejection of the view that philosophy’s task is the
parochial one of analyzing human concepts in favor of a metaphilosophy that makes philosophy a
“profoundly important and foundational enterprise.” Moreover, studies like Leslie et al.’s (2015),
which suggests that philosophers (along with members of some other disciplines) view inherent

One might object that many philosophers, especially in certain historical epochs, likely did not view themselves as
pursuing the answers to especially deep questions. I suspect that Nietzsche would dismiss these thinkers as mere
“scholars” (BGE 6) and offer some other psychological explanation for their interest in philosophy. My account, for its
part, is committed only to the claim that if these philosophers weren’t attracted to philosophy because they wanted to
find the answers to profound questions, then they are less likely to have been metaphysical optimists. Although I won’t
argue for that claim here, I take it to be prima facie plausible: ordinary language philosophers, for instance, would not have
had much reason to claim that our concepts had some deep connection to the intrinsic metaphysical nature of reality.
20
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genius as important for philosophical ability, fit quite comfortably with Nietzsche’s claim that
philosophers have an inflated sense of their own significance.
Nietzsche’s account also requires us to believe that a philosopher’s views are a function not
just of evidence, but also of her psychological profile. This piece of the account is well supported by
recent empirical work. As mentioned earlier, studies like Schwitzgebel and Cushman’s (2012, 2015)
or Tobia et al.’s (2013) show that philosophical views are vulnerable to factors other than evidence.
More directly, Holtzman’s (2013) and Byrd’s (2015) studies link philosophical positions with
personality traits and one’s propensity to answer questions intuitively or reflectively, respectively.
The view that philosophical positions can be determined by one’s desires is not a distant leap from
these studies. Moreover, work on motivated reasoning more generally shows that desires have a
pervasive and powerful influence on most people’s beliefs.21 It would be quite remarkable if
philosophers’ judgments were immune to the motivational forces that guide so much other thinking.
Finally, even if we accept that philosophers are motivated by a will to power, that this will to
power would push them toward conditions under which they take themselves to have reached
certainty about the deepest nature of reality, and that being so pushed could influence their
philosophical views, we need to believe that metaphysical optimism is the sort of view towards
which philosophers could be pushed. I hope to have shown in the last section that metaphysical
optimism is exactly the kind of view that philosophers would be attracted to; metaphysical optimism
lends itself to philosophers’ epistemic needs and to their inflated self-conception.
To sum up the foregoing, the substantive commitments of the Nietzschean account are both
independently plausible and supported by empirical work. For this reason, the explanation of
metaphysical optimism that account offers does not bring with it unacceptable baggage. If that
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Kunda (1990) offers an early overview of the evidence for this claim.

34
explanation is superior to its competitors, we should have no qualms accepting it. I’ll now argue that
the explanation I’ve offered is indeed the best on offer.
3.5

The Virtues of the Nietzschean Explanation

Of course, since metaphysical optimism is a phenomenon that I’ve myself named and
classified, there are no other explanations of that phenomenon as such on the market. Nonetheless,
we can compare the Nietzschean explanation to the structure of other possible explanations. I’ll
consider two alternatives and argue that the Nietzschean explanation is superior to both of them.
Call the first alternative explanation the dismissive explanation. On this view, instances of
metaphysical optimism are not a special class of poor philosophical reasoning, but rather ordinary
lapses in judgment. Philosophers are merely people, and they’re prone to make and publish mistakes.
Sometimes these mistakes happen to involve wrongly taking facts about human behavior to give
reason to think that nonhuman reality is a certain way.
The dismissive explanation is not particularly attractive. Although it is admirably
parsimonious (involving no substantive commitments except that philosophers are merely people), it
is ill-equipped to explain both why the mistakes I’ve called metaphysical optimism survive reflection,
colloquia, and peer review and why this sort of mistake is so common. If metaphysical optimism is
merely an innocent error, it should be easy for philosophers to realize their mistakes once they’ve
been pointed out, and it should be easy for other philosophers to point these mistakes out. But if
this is the case, we wouldn’t expect to find so many published cases of metaphysical optimism. That
is, instances of metaphysical optimism should not be much more common than instances of invalid
arguments, non sequiturs, and inconsistencies. But although philosophers are laudably skilled at
exterminating the latter sort of mistakes, they do not seem so skilled at stamping out optimism.
So we’ve identified one virtue of the Nietzschean explanation: it explains how philosophers
could make this specific sort of error and fail to correct for it. Let’s now consider a second
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alternative explanation, the motivated reasoning explanation. On this view, philosophers become
metaphysical optimists when they need to argue in favor of a particular view that they antecedently
desire be true. So, for instance, David Lewis may have wanted modal realism to be true, and so he
used all available resources to argue in favor of it.
Like the dismissive explanation, this explanation does not come with too much baggage: we
need only believe that certain philosophers want some positions to be true and that they are tempted
to use poor reasoning to support those positions. Nonetheless, it suffers from a variety of problems.
First, for any particular case of metaphysical optimism, we would require a story explaining why the
philosopher in question wanted his or her conclusion to be true. So, for example, we would need to
know why Lewis desired that modal realism be true. But these explanations are likely to be ad hoc or
simply implausible; philosophical debates often center around abstract matters unlikely to bear on
anyone’s quality of life.22 Of course, it will often be the case that philosophers are motivated to
believe some particular substantive philosophical thesis, either because those theses are important to
their quality of life or because some other factor (say, a desire to agree with one’s dissertation
director) motivates them. However, explaining the prevalence of metaphysical optimism by appeal
to these isolated cases of motivated reasoning shares the problems of the dismissive explanation.
Even if particular philosophers desire that certain views be correct, other philosophers will not
always share those desires. We would expect those latter philosophers to point out the shoddy
reasoning characteristic of motivated cognition, and the motivated philosophers should be driven to
find better arguments for their positions. But if this were the case, published instances of

This isn’t to say that philosophers never hold certain views and make certain errors because of their desires or psychophysical constitution. As mentioned above, Nietzsche quite commonly diagnoses philosophical views in this way. I mean
to claim only that metaphysical optimism as a pervasive phenomenon is better explained by the Nietzschean account than by
individual instances of motivated reasoning. That claim does not rule out the possibility that some, or even many, cases
of metaphysical optimism are to be explained by a desire that some particular philosophical claim be true.
22
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metaphysical optimism ought to be about as common as other errors made in service of motivated
reasoning.
The motivated reasoning explanation brings to light another virtue of the Nietzschean
explanation: since it takes metaphysical optimism to be a view that is desirable in itself for
philosophers, it need not explain, for every optimistically argued for substantive metaphysical
position, how that position could be the target of motivated reasoning.
These two virtues give a rough picture of the superiority of the Nietzschean explanation.
Metaphysical optimism is a peculiar phenomenon for which typical explanations of poor reasoning
will not suffice. First, it manifests itself among a class of people typically quite efficient at and
dedicated to exterminating poor reasoning. Second, it is not typically enlisted in the service of
reaching conclusions that philosophers have particularly strong reason to believe. For these reasons,
appeals either to the typical cognitive flaws of humans or the desires of individual philosophers will
not make proper sense of the phenomenon. Instead, we need an account that can explain why
philosophers as such would be vulnerable to this sort of mistake. The Nietzschean account satisfies
this requirement quite nicely.23 For this reason, its explanatory benefits outweigh its substantive
commitments, and so we have good reason to accept it.
4

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHIATRY

If Nietzsche is right about us philosophers, then many of our philosophical beliefs are held
not because the balance of evidence is in their favor, but rather because holding those beliefs is
conducive to our feeling of power. I think viewing this diagnosis as a debunking history of

This desideratum may also seem to call for a sociological explanation; perhaps philosophers as such are vulnerable to this
sort of mistake because of some sociological peculiarity of the discipline. For instance, it may be conventional to appeal
to metaphysically optimistic lines of inference, so philosophers feel comfortable using (or even feel pressured to use)
such lines of inference even when they are not themselves convinced of their legitimacy. Although I’m inclined to think
that some claim along these lines must be true, I don’t view these explanations as competing with the Nietzschean
explanation. Rather, the psychological and sociological explanations complement each other: for the foregoing
sociological explanation to work, there must be some reason that optimistic reasoning is and remains conventional, and
Nietzsche’s psychology of philosophers fills this gap in well.
23
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philosophical activity is helpful for cashing out its upshot. More specifically, I suggest that we view
Nietzsche as giving a (literal) history of the origin and development of philosophical activity, which
history gives us reason to doubt that that activity is truth-tracking or valuable.
Think of debunking histories in general as doing the following. A theorist selects for
investigation some practice or set of beliefs that purports to have some sort of legitimacy, e.g. being
truth-tracking, or being God’s will, or being conducive to human flourishing. She then investigates
the history of that practice. The history of that practice will give a kind of higher-order evidence
bearing on the likelihood that the practice is legitimate.24 Although a history does not demonstrate that
its target has or lacks a particular kind of legitimacy, it can give us reason to suspect that the target has
or lacks that legitimacy. For instance, learning that I acquired my religious beliefs from an unreliable
source doesn’t show that Christianity is false, but it does give me reason to suspect that my belief may
be false.
The history of a practice could undermine its claim to legitimacy in a number of ways. For
instance, it may show that a set of beliefs has an etiology viciously unrelated to anything that would
make those beliefs likely to be true. Evolutionary debunking stories about our moral beliefs function
like this: the debunker purports to show that our moral beliefs can be causally traced back to
evolutionary pressures that would have had nothing to do with the moral truth, and she infers that
our moral beliefs are unjustified and likely false. Alternatively, a debunking history might give reason
to doubt that some practice achieves the ends it claims to achieve. For instance, Marxist analyses
may purport to show that a social practice owes its existence to its usefulness for the ruling classes,
and that therefore that practice may not in fact be necessary or beneficial for the masses.

Readers of GM II may suspect that here I make the mistake of confusing “the cause of the genesis of a thing” with
“its final usefulness” (GM II: 12). However, I do not think that my reading of debunking histories in fact commits this
error; I do not claim that the original cause of some practice tells us what it is currently good for. Rather, I think that
certain causal histories can give us reason to suspect that a practice lacks the legitimacy it claims for itself. Histories are a
tool for stimulating further inquiry into a practice, rather than a final verdict on that practice.
24
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I think we should view Nietzsche’s diagnosis of philosophers as just such a debunking
history. We could produce, for any particular philosopher, a history of her philosophical views.25 If
Nietzsche’s account of philosophers is accurate, then the etiology of most people’s philosophical
views has more to do with their prejudices, drives, and inclinations than the truth or the available
evidence. Since such an etiology gives us reason to doubt that those philosophical views are likely to
be true, Nietzsche’s account of philosophers amounts to a debunking history of many of our
philosophical beliefs.
Viewed this way, Nietzsche’s diagnosis has two sorts of philosophical upshot. First, since the
history of a phenomenon tells us something about the causal origin of that phenomenon, that
history can also help to explain more features of that phenomenon than its mere existence. Call this
a history’s theoretical upshot. In our case, I think that Nietzsche’s account of philosophers helps
explain why philosophy hasn’t made more progress on central questions, why academic philosophy
is characterized by such striking demographic imbalances, and why, for certain philosophical
positions, those positions gained or lost favor regardless of the evidence for or against them.
Second, since a debunking history undermines a practice’s claim to legitimacy, that history bears on
how and even whether that practice ought to be pursued. Call this a history’s practical upshot. In
our case, Nietzsche’s account suggests that philosophers ought to lower their credence in the
affected beliefs and, depending on just how pervasive these illicit influences are, alter philosophical
methodology to compensate for those influences in more or less drastic ways. I’ll discuss the
theoretical and practical upshot of Nietzsche’s diagnosis in turn.

Note that this is distinct from a genealogy of the practice of academic philosophy; I don’t think that Nietzsche
provides an overarching explanation of the emergence of e.g. philosophy departments, conferences, peer review, etc.
Rather, he provides a general outline for understanding why particular philosophers form the beliefs that they do.
25
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4.1

The Theoretical Upshot of Nietzsche’s Diagnosis

Recall the broad outlines of Nietzsche’s account: some people become philosophers because
philosophical activity is conducive to those individuals’ power and helps satisfy those individuals’
drives, and philosophers form the views they do for the same reasons. If this account is accurate, it
would provide a fruitful means for investigating sociological features of the discipline, since the
ground-level facts about what motivates people to philosophize, and to philosophize in the way that
they do, will bear on the higher-level facts about what happens when those people interact.
In his (2015), David Chalmers draws attention to one such sociological feature. Chalmers
argues that philosophy has failed to converge on the answers to the “big questions,” and he canvases
a variety of possible explanations for this failure. On his view, we philosophers have made much less
progress toward agreement on the answers to the central questions in our discipline than have
members of other disciplines, e.g., in math, physics, and chemistry (7). In support of this claim, he
cites evidence from the 2009 PhilPapers Survey, which surveyed professional philosophers about
their views on thirty philosophical questions. Chalmers cites questions about “the external world,
free will, god, knowledge, meta-ethics, metaphilosophy, mind, and normative ethics” (7) as among
the big questions of philosophy. Of these questions, only 2 have greater than 60% agreement on one
answer (specifically, 82% of respondents endorsed non-skeptical realism about the external world,
and 73% endorsed atheism). Chalmers takes these relatively low numbers to suggest that we
philosophers are not moving very quickly toward convergence.
Chalmers goes on to ask why philosophy has failed to converge on answers to these
questions. He runs through a number of possible explanations, such as the inefficacy of
philosophical argumentation at convincing people, the possibility that philosophical debates are just
verbal disputes, and the possibility that “there is something distinctive about human minds or about
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philosophers’ minds that prevents convergence on philosophical questions” (23). However, he runs
through these explanations only schematically, neglecting to fill out the details for many of them.
I think the Nietzschean account of philosophers helps fill in part of the explanation for our
failure to converge on the big questions. That is, Nietzsche tells us what it is about philosophers’
minds that prevents convergence. Part of Chalmers’ puzzlement about our lack of agreement stems
from his belief that “attaining the truth is the primary aim at least of many parts of philosophy, such
as analytic philosophy” (11). Nietzsche, of course, doubts that attaining the truth is typically
philosophers’ aim; it is only in “rare and unusual cases” that a “will to truth might actually be at
issue” (BGE 10). If Nietzsche is right, it is relatively easy to explain why philosophers have failed to
converge on the truth to the big questions: they aren’t primarily seeking the truth, but rather seeking
to inflate and rationalize their prejudices.
Contra Nietzsche’s diagnosis, many philosophers would surely claim that they really do
intend to attain the truth. Although the sincerity of such a self-ascription would be hard to gauge,
Nietzsche offers an explanation of why even consciously truth-directed philosophers would fail to
converge on the truth: our drives continue subconsciously to impact our evaluation of evidence and
arguments even when we explicitly aim to figure out the truth. Since our desires are idiosyncratic and
personal (they “bear decided and decisive witness” to who we are (BGE 6)), we should not expect
them to lead toward convergence.
It may be objected that Nietzsche’s account would lead us to expect philosophers to agree on
the answers to many philosophical questions. For Nietzsche seems to think that the philosophical
type has a large set of drives in common. If those drives are what determine philosophers’ views,
then they should lead most philosophers to the same views. Convergence of this sort would likely
not be convergence on the philosophical truth, but it would be convergence nonetheless.
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However, this objection misconstrues two pieces of Nietzsche’s account. First, Nietzsche
does not claim that the same drives motivate all philosophers; the psychological portraits he offers of,
say, Kant and Schopenhauer have quite distinct forces guiding each philosopher’s thought. Second,
Nietzsche does not claim that drives uniquely determine philosophical views. Different drives can
lead people to adopt the same views (as, say, both priests and the herd come to adopt ascetic ideals),
and the same drives can lead different people to adopt different views, depending on the
circumstances in which they are embedded.
The Nietzschean account of philosophers also provides some guidance for investigating
academic philosophy’s imbalanced demographic makeup. Since that account specifies the
psychological profile of the type of person likely to be attracted to philosophy, it suggests that
groups who are underrepresented among philosophers may simply not exhibit the psychological
profile typical of philosophers. That is, philosophy might have relatively few women and people of
color in part because women and people of color are less likely (for whatever reason) to instantiate
the peculiar psychological profile of philosophers. Of course, this would only be one factor
explaining philosophy’s demographic composition.
This approach to philosophical demography shows some affinity with remarks made by
David Papineau in his (2015) and with Leslie et al.’s (2015). Papineau suggests that women may be
self-selecting out of philosophy: they see contemporary philosophical practice as the intellectual
equivalent of snooker, “and conclude that they could be doing something better with their lives.”
Leslie et al. show that academic fields where innate genius or brilliance is assumed to be necessary
for success typically have fewer women and that philosophy is just such a field. Both these
explanations of the gender imbalance match up neatly with the Nietzschean approach. Papineau’s
claim that women see philosophy as pointless could be supplemented by evidence that women tend
not to be of the psychological type that finds philosophy satisfying, and Leslie et al.’s finding that
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philosophers are highly concerned with innate genius fits cleanly with Nietzsche’s remarks about
philosophers’ inflated self-conception. Philosophers think of themselves as a special kind of truthdirected individual, and (so I speculate) the characteristics philosophers usually associate with
themselves are associated more with men than women.
Finally, the Nietzschean diagnosis could make sense of wider trends in the popularity of
certain philosophical positions. For instance, Amie Thomasson (2015) asks why “the Quinean
approach to ontology” is “so universally adopted.” She speculates that philosophers may have been
attracted to (what she considers a misinterpretation of) Quine’s views on ontology because “there
was, perhaps, a longing to return to metaphysics” or because “it was attractive indeed to think of
metaphysics as ‘on a par with natural science’” (53). Nietzsche’s account supplements her
speculations by explaining more thoroughly why philosophers would long to return to metaphysics
or want to think of themselves as on a par with scientists. Practicing old-fashioned metaphysics and
viewing oneself as on a par with natural science would be conducive to philosophers’ feeling of
power and the satisfaction of their drives; old-fashioned metaphysics likely feels much more
significant than the sort of philosophical lexicography practiced in the middle of the twentieth
century, and seeing one’s activity as akin to natural science would be quite satisfying for those who
wanted secure knowledge about the way the world is.
The turn to neo-Quinean ontology is just one example of a philosophical trend that could
call for explanation. Insofar as shifts in the popularity of philosophical and metaphilosophical
positions are underdetermined by shifts in the evidence in favor of those positions, those
philosophical trends will call for some psychological or sociological explanation. The Nietzschean
account offers a general guideline for interpreting these trends: philosophers will be attracted to
views that make them feel the most productive and important.
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4.2

The Practical Upshot of Nietzsche’s Diagnosis

So much for the theoretical upshot of the Nietzschean account; let’s now turn to its practical
significance. I claimed that Nietzsche’s diagnosis would amount to a debunking history for any
philosophical beliefs formed in the way he specifies (namely, those beliefs formed because they are
conducive to a philosopher’s feeling of power or the satisfaction of her drives). While it isn’t
plausible here to determine to whom and to what beliefs Nietzsche’s diagnosis applies, we can say
something about how worried we ought to be about the status of our philosophical beliefs and
about how we ought to react to Nietzsche’s diagnosis.
For our beliefs to be justified, they should be formed in ways that are likely to track the
truth. If we have positive evidence that our beliefs were formed in a way that wouldn’t track the
truth, then our beliefs probably aren’t justified.26 For instance, if I believe in the existence of an allpowerful and all-knowing God merely because my parents inculcated such a belief in me as a child
and I systematically ignore evidence to the contrary, my belief is not justified (although it may
nonetheless turn out to be true), since it wasn’t formed in a way that would track the truth.
Exactly this sort of story applies to our philosophical beliefs, if Nietzsche is right. We adopt
a particular philosophical belief (say, that humans have free will) because the belief is conducive to
our feeling of power and the satisfaction of our drives. We proceed to strengthen our confidence in
this belief by selective appraisal of the evidence in favor of and against that belief; we take arguments
that humans do have free will to be strong, and arguments that humans don’t have free will to be
weak. But this evaluation of the evidence, on Nietzsche’s view, is motivated more by the
psychological needs pushing us to have this belief than by sensitivity to good reasons.
This way of forming and maintaining a philosophical belief is therefore unreliable; it is
responsive neither to the truth of the matter at hand (since the philosopher in question would
26

This account of higher-order evidence owes much to the account given in Vavova (2014) and (unpublished ms.).
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believe that we had free will whether or not we in fact did) nor to the best available evidence (since
the philosopher in question would believe that we had free will whether or not the best available
evidence suggested that we did). So the philosopher is unjustified in holding her belief.
If Nietzsche is right, many of our philosophical beliefs have causal histories much like the
one just sketched out. Except for the rare cases where our psychological needs are likely to track the
philosophical truth, beliefs formed in this way will be unreliable, and so unjustified.
Supposing Nietzsche were right, then, how ought we respond to the knowledge that many of
our philosophical beliefs are unjustified? Although I doubt that any single course of action will be
appropriate for every case, it’s nonetheless worthwhile to sketch out some possible responses as well
as the conditions under which each of those responses would be appropriate. I’d like to view these
responses as existing on a spectrum of possible cases. Some philosophers will have reason to think
that only a few of their beliefs were formed in the illicit way Nietzsche describes, whereas others will
find that many of their beliefs were so formed. Similarly, some philosophers will care less about
having true or justified philosophical beliefs than others. And, in the same way, some philosophers
are less attached to current methods of philosophical inquiry than others. Each of these criteria (and
still others) bear on what kind of response to Nietzsche’s account is appropriate. For now, let’s see
how philosophers ought, epistemically, to act.
If Nietzsche’s diagnosis extends to only a few of one’s philosophical beliefs, it would be
entirely appropriate to lower one’s credence in the relevant beliefs and carry on one’s philosophical
way. However, Nietzsche seems to think that his account has much wider scope; recall that he
thinks almost no philosophers have a “conception of the basic demands of intellectual integrity” (A
12). If the majority of philosophical beliefs are formed in the unreliable ways Nietzsche describes,
then it would hardly be appropriate simply to reduce one’s credence in all the particular beliefs
shown to be so formed and continue philosophizing in the same way with respect to other beliefs.
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This for two reasons. First, for philosophers to continue working, they had better have some beliefs,
and the areas in which a philosopher is drawn to work are the same areas in which she is prone to
motivated reasoning (if this Nietzschean view is right, anyway). If someone working primarily on the
metaphysics of time found that her preference for the A-theory was motivated by irrelevant factors,
we should not expect her to be satisfied by the advice to lower her confidence in the truth of the Atheory and start studying some other region of philosophy. After all, she must care about the nature
of time, or else she would not have been susceptible to the Nietzschean diagnosis in the first place.
But if she wants to continue working in the philosophy of time, she had better revise her
methodology for doing so. Hence the second reason that simply lowering credence and moving on
to other regions of philosophy is unsatisfactory: if Nietzsche’s diagnosis applies to many of our
philosophical beliefs, we have good reason to think that the methodology used to arrive at and
support those beliefs is lacking. Nietzsche doesn’t show us how exactly that methodology is flawed,
but (if his diagnosis extends to us moderns) he does show us that that methodology is at best highly
susceptible to distortion by irrelevant influences. So we should adjust that methodology, either by
altering it to control for irrelevant influences or by removing those irrelevant influences themselves.
I doubt that the Nietzschean will hold out much hope for the latter sort of adjustment. It is
unlikely, given the facts of her diagnosis, that philosophers could themselves overcome the
psychological forces that distort their thinking. For these psychological forces are the things that
drive them to philosophize in the first place: removing them would amount to removing the desire
to philosophize. So we had better pursue the former option, and try to adjust philosophical
methodology to better account for motivated reasoning.
What might such adjustments look like? At a minimum, we should become more suspicious
of arguments in favor of conclusions that we have reason to believe we or others will be strongly
motivated to accept. Note that being suspicious does not mean adopting a negative dogmatism and
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rejecting those arguments outright. Instead, we ought to both apply more scrutiny to others’
arguments and be less confident in our immediate evaluations of the strength of arguments. We
ought especially to become more skeptical of argumentative moves that are easily influenced by
one’s desires that certain conclusions be true. A common move of this sort involves claiming that a
certain tradeoff in theoretical desiderata is desirable, e.g., claiming that a theory is better than
another because it yields greater explanatory power at the cost of a larger ontology. I suspect that
one’s evaluation of the worth of a given tradeoff is easily influenced by one’s arational psychological
needs. For it is not as though there is a body of uncontroversial evidence showing how likely to be
true philosophical theories with given amounts of, say, explanatory power are; one’s preferences for
theoretical virtues, then, are difficult to subject to rational scrutiny (and may be resistant to change
even in response to such scrutiny). So we ought to be skeptical of how people choose to balance
different theoretical virtues, and we ought to be similarly skeptical about other forms of argument
that are similarly difficult to subject to rational scrutiny.
Alternatively, philosophers might adjust their methodology by changing their view of what
that methodology yields. If philosophers find that controlling for motivated reasoning is too difficult
or just undesirable, they might allow for motivated reasoning and change their view of the status of
philosophical beliefs. That is to say, philosophers could change their methodology such that it would
in fact produce what it is supposed to produce (namely, true or justified beliefs), or they could
preserve the methodology and alter their view of what it is supposed to produce.
A variety of views of the nature of philosophical beliefs could satisfy this requirement. For
instance, philosophers might adopt a Carnapian (1931) view where philosophical claims are noncognitive expressions of one’s way of life. Since expressions of one’s way of life are not the sort of
thing that can be true or false, philosophers need not worry that their expressions may be subject to
influences that do not track the truth of things. Philosophers could also refuse to endorse the
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deliverances of their methodology. They might determine which views seem plausible to them, but
refrain from giving much credence to any philosophical view. Alternatively, they might adopt a sort
of fictionalist stance and pretend that certain philosophical theses are true within a certain context,
without endorsing those theses simpliciter.
While these responses may seem unorthodox, it is worth pointing out that they may be what
honest philosophers are forced to if Nietzsche is right about us. For if poor reasoning is an
inexorable feature of philosophical reasoning, those philosophers motivated to act as they
epistemically should would be obliged to accommodate that poor reasoning without sacrificing the
value they place on epistemic virtues. If philosophers cannot alter the way that they reason about
philosophical matters such that no irrelevant influences can distort the deliverances of that reasoning
(and Nietzsche gives good reason to think that they cannot), they must cease believing that their
reasoning arrives at the truth. But insofar as they are motivated to keep reasoning in the way they
do, they then must change their view of what their reasoning amounts to. Non-cognitivist,
(Pyrrhonian) skeptical, and fictionalist views of philosophical claims suit this role quite nicely.
In short, then, we ought to reduce our credence in any philosophical beliefs to which a
Nietzschean diagnosis applies. If that diagnosis applies to a relatively small number of our beliefs,
then it would be appropriate to reduce our confidence in those beliefs and continue on with
philosophical activity as usual. But if, as Nietzsche seems to think, that diagnosis applies to many of
our beliefs, then we ought either to alter philosophical methodology to better compensate for
motivated reasoning or to change our view of the status of philosophical claims, such that their
being influenced by our psychological needs is no epistemic demerit.
5

CONCLUSION

So much for how philosophers ought epistemically to respond to Nietzsche’s diagnosis.
Although that diagnosis entails that philosophers have an epistemic duty merely to adjust their
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methodology in a certain way, it suggests even more radically that philosophers may have an allthings-considered duty not to practice philosophy at all. That is, it gives us some reason to doubt that
philosophical activity is worth doing. I’ll discuss four ways in which Nietzsche’s diagnosis gives us
reason to doubt this.
First, Nietzsche suggests that many of our philosophical beliefs are held in large part because
holding those beliefs is conducive to our feeling of power and the satisfaction of our drives. If those
beliefs are in fact held on those grounds, then we ought to lower our confidence in them, since they
were formed unreliably. Similarly, our view of the significance of philosophical inquiry may also be
held because that view is conducive to our feeling of power and the satisfaction of our drives. That
is to say, we may think of philosophy as a “profoundly important and foundational intellectual
enterprise” not because we have good reason to think that it is such an enterprise, but rather because
we strongly desire and need it to be such an enterprise. But if our belief in the value of philosophy is
grounded in this way, we ought to lower our confidence that that belief is accurate.
Of course, the existence of a plausible story suggesting that philosophers are motivated to
think their discipline is worthwhile shows neither that philosophy isn’t in fact worthwhile nor that
philosophers do form their views in this illicitly motivated way. It’s perfectly possible that
philosophy is a valuable activity, and that philosophers believe this because of (say) the ample
evidence demonstrating it.
However, if we accept the other pieces of the Nietzschean account, we have good evidence
that philosophers have not formed their belief in the value of philosophy in a reliable way. For, on
Nietzsche’s view, we philosophers typically justify our activities by appealing to a seriously inaccurate
view of our discipline. Philosophy is typically taken to be valuable insofar as it helps us approach the
truth about fundamental matters, or makes us reconsider unjustified beliefs about ourselves and the
world, or improves our beliefs about how life ought to be lived. But if Nietzsche is right, philosophy

49
rarely succeeds in achieving any of these goals. Where we take ourselves to be carefully inquiring
into the fundamental truths of reality, Nietzsche takes us to be sublimating and elevating our
idiosyncratic needs and desires.
That our view of our activity is so inaccurate gives us further reason to lower our credence in
the belief that philosophy is worthwhile. First, it lends support to the Nietzschean claim that our
belief in philosophy’s value was formed unreliably. For our normative view about philosophy’s value
was likely formed by the same processes as our descriptive view of philosophy’s worldly impact. But,
if Nietzsche is right, our descriptive view about philosophy is radically false. That our descriptive
view is so drastically mistaken suggests that the processes that yielded that view are not reliable. And
since those same unreliable processes were likely responsible for our normative view of philosophy’s
value, we have good reason to think that that normative view is not in fact justified.
Indeed, we might suspect that our descriptive view of philosophical practice is as distorted as
it is precisely because this is the view necessary to justify our normative view of philosophical practice.
Contemporary work on motivated reasoning shows such a link: people often shape their descriptive
beliefs in order to justify antecedently held normative beliefs.27 The Nietzschean account shows
quite nicely how philosophers might do something similar to support their belief in philosophy’s
value. Where conservatives downplay the descriptive facts about the risks of widespread gun
ownership in order to justify their normative endorsement of gun ownership, philosophers may
inflate the descriptive facts about how philosophy impacts people’s lives in order to justify their
normative endorsement of philosophy. But, of course, this form of motivated reasoning is unlikely
to be reliable, so we should lower our confidence in the belief that philosophy is valuable.
Etiological considerations aside, the inaccuracy of our view of philosophical activity suggests
that philosophy may not be worthwhile in another way. If the typical justifications for a practice
27
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presuppose an inaccurate conception of that practice, we have reason to suspect that that practice is
not worthwhile. While the failure of existing justifications is not positive evidence that a practice
isn’t valuable, it does give reason to lower our credence in the belief that that practice is valuable.
This is so for a variety of reasons. First, insofar as our belief in philosophy’s value rests on those
existing justifications, if those justifications are inadequate, we ought to lower our credence in that
belief. Second, philosophy’s not being worthwhile would offer a rather compelling explanation for
the failure of typical arguments to the effect that philosophy is worthwhile. While this explanation
wouldn’t be the only possible one, its immediate plausibility gives some reason to suspect that it may
be true. Third, the absence of justifications of philosophy’s value that rest on a more accurate
picture of the discipline suggests that such an accurate picture may not in fact justify philosophy’s
value. On the Nietzschean view, philosophers are antecedently motivated to think that philosophy is
an activity of great importance, so they will be motivated to seek out evidence in favor of that belief.
But if the only evidence they can find is fabricated, then we ought to suspect that legitimate evidence
is unavailable. For, other things being equal, we would predict philosophers to create legitimate
justifications for their activity, were such justifications available. That they do not produce such
justifications suggests (but, of course, does not prove) that there may not be any.
Nietzsche’s diagnosis of philosophers suggests that their activity may not be worthwhile for
yet another reason: it may be the case that no one who understands what motivates philosophical
activity would want to engage in it. Or rather: it may be the case that philosophizing cannot be
reflectively endorsed. For if Nietzsche is right, only a rather peculiar subset of people are motivated
to do philosophy in the first place, namely those for whom philosophizing offers a chance to
rationalize and sublimate one’s prejudices. But for these people to be motivated to conduct
philosophy, philosophy must not appear to be an elaborate game of justifying one’s antecedently held
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beliefs. Rather, philosophy must appear to be a rigorous and objective field of inquiry within which
one comes to learn the truth about deeply important moral and metaphysical matters.
But, on Nietzsche’s view, this rosy picture of philosophy is flatly inaccurate. It is only “in
rare and unusual cases” that a “will to truth” (BGE 10) motivates someone to conduct philosophical
inquiries. But were a potential philosopher to come to learn both that they were motivated to
philosophize primarily because they wanted (consciously or not) to assure themselves of things they
already believed and that philosophical inquiries would likely not generate true answers to deep
questions, their desire to conduct philosophy would likely fade. If, as Nietzsche suggests, those
motivated to do philosophy must have an inaccurate view of the discipline, then anyone with an
accurate view would no longer be so motivated.
As with the previous considerations, philosophy’s inability to be reflectively endorsed does
not itself show that philosophy is not worthwhile. It may be the case that philosophy produces a
number of valuable goods that simply fail to motivate actual philosophers, or that unreflectively
endorsed philosophy is nonetheless worth practicing. Still, we ought to be skeptical of the value of
any practice that attracts only people with a false view of what is going on in that practice.
So, if Nietzsche’s diagnosis of us philosophers is correct, we have a number of reasons to
lower our confidence in the belief that philosophy is worthwhile. That belief may be just another
manifestation of our arational, idiosyncratic psychological needs. Given the ability of Nietzsche’s
account of philosophers to explain otherwise puzzling phenomena within the discipline and the
upshot that account would have for the practice and value of philosophy, we philosophers ought to
begin taking it seriously.
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